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Objective To repeat and update our previous evaluation (2005) of Europe’s national pandemic influenza preparedness plans and 
assess the progress that has been made.
Methods We assessed published national pandemic influenza preparedness plans from the European Union countries, from 
the two acceding countries (Bulgaria and Romania) and from Norway, Switzerland and Turkey. Plans were eligible for inclusion 
if formally published before 30 September 2006. We referred to WHO guidelines and used a systematically applied data extraction 
form. We considered plans in relation to border control measures, antiviral drugs and vaccines.
Findings Twenty-nine countries had plans that were included in the analysis, compared with 21 countries in 2005. Substantial 
differences existed in countries’ plans for border control measures, and many plans diverged from WHO guidelines. Likewise, countries’ 
plans on antiviral drugs and vaccines varied and operational planning remained weak.
Conclusion Although progress has been made in the completeness of plans, problems remain unsolved regarding national 
plans’ divergence from international recommendations, persisting strategic incoherence and operational limitations in relation to 
potentially scarce resources. Border control plans also show gaps and inconsistencies, and these are likely to be politically volatile 
during a pandemic.
Bulletin of the World Health Organization 2007;85:923–929.
Une traduction en français de ce résumé figure à la fin de l’article. Al final del artículo se facilita una traducción al español. .ةلاقلما هذهل لماكلا صنلا ةياهن في ةصلاخلا هذهل ةيبرعلا ةمجترلا
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Introduction
With the emergence of the H5N1 avian 
influenza virus in Asia and outbreaks on 
the European continent and elsewhere, 
concerns about a human influenza 
pandemic are growing. In April 2005, 
WHO expressed concern about the 
general lack of global preparedness for 
pandemic influenza,1 and updated its 
1999 global influenza preparedness plan 
to outline the components that each 
country’s plan should include to ensure 
an effective response.2 The Ministerial 
Meeting and Donor Conference that 
took place on 6–8 December 2006 in 
Bamako, Mali, drew attention to the 
urgent need for international organiza-
tions and the donor community to share 
emerging good practices, notably those 
coming from Europe, in order to guide 
the global response.3
In 2005, WHO published a check-
list to facilitate preparedness planning. 
Its aim was to maintain essential ser-
vices, to reduce disease transmission and 
the socioeconomic consequences of a 
pandemic and to minimize cases, hos-
pitalizations and deaths.4 The European 
Commission (EC) updated its planning 
in line with the revised WHO defini-
tions of pandemic phases and the cre-
ation of the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC). A 
subsequent WHO document 2 urged 
every country “to develop or update a 
national influenza preparedness plan” 
and suggested that “each national author-
ity should play its part towards achiev-
ing the international harmonization of 
preparedness measures”.
We previously analysed European 
national strategic preparedness plans for 
pandemic human influenza published 
before November 2005. This study’s 
findings showed considerable variation 
between different countries’ plans, and 
important gaps in many.5 These differ-
ences and gaps included border control 
issues, antiviral drugs and vaccines – 
all issues that are likely to test health 
systems’ responses because of scarce 
resources or the need for international 
coordination, coherence and coopera-
tion. During the Austrian Presidency of 
the European Union (EU), January to 
June 2006, these issues were predicted 
to be particularly politically sensitive by 
policy-makers. We repeated our evalu-
ation of national preparedness plans in 
Europe to assess progress made between 
November 2005 and November 2006, 
and analyse these three important stra-
tegic planning elements.
Methods
We sought plans from the 25 EU coun-
tries, the two acceding countries (Bul-
garia and Romania), and three non-EU 
countries (Norway, Switzerland and 
Turkey). We evaluated each plan by 
methods similar to those described 
above, using the WHO checklist4–6 but 
expanding our assessment of the three 
areas of strategic interest.2,7,8 Plans in 
the public domain were identified and 
sourced through the ECDC, WHO, 
internet-based searches and countries’ 
health ministries. Plans were eligible for 
inclusion if formally published before 
30 September 2006. All plans not avail-
able in either English or French were 
translated into English by public health 
specialists fluent in the original language. 
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We assessed national strategic plans and, 
where clear links were documented, 
national operational plans.
A data extraction tool was designed, 
piloted, modified and finalized. We 
selected variables with particular refer-
ence to WHO guidelines on vaccines, 
antiviral drugs and border control, and 
used 142 criteria to assess plans. We 
also recorded priority populations for 
antiviral drugs and vaccines, whether the 
sizes of populations were defined (and if 
so, what these sizes were) and whether 
certain populations were ranked more 
highly than others in terms of favoured 
access. We recorded antiviral stockpile 
sizes if mentioned. Preparedness plans 
were scored independently by two 
researchers; where differences arose, 
agreement was reached through review 
and discussion.
Results
We identified 29 plans from a range of 
sources (Table 1, available at: http://www.
who.int/bulletin/volumes/85/12/06-
039834/en/index.html). We translated 12 
plans into English. Overall scores for key 
pandemic preparedness criteria concerned 
with border control, vaccine policies and 
antiviral policies are presented in Figs. 1, 2 
and 3.
Border control
Strategic planning in relation to border 
control varied in terms of completeness 
of issues considered and approaches 
discussed (Fig. 1). Travel restrictions, for 
example, were anticipated by 16 coun-
tries, whereas two countries explicitly 
advised against such measures. Notably, 
five countries envisaged an absolute ban 
on cross-border travel, while 16 coun-
tries expressed an intention to follow 
WHO travel advice. Only a minority 
of plans detailed the legal foundation 
for possible restriction of cross-border 
population movements.
The need for information and guid-
ance on travel was widely acknowledged. 
However, planning for implementation 
of travel-related public health measures 
was less coherent. Many countries 
diverged from WHO guidance; for ex-
ample, 17 countries favoured the intro-
duction of specific entry screening mea-
sures.9 Two countries planned to use 
thermal screening, and four planned to 
screen for symptoms. Although WHO 
Absolute ban on the entry
of people arriving from affected areas
Selective restrictions on the entry of people
arriving from affected areas
Mentions following
WHO recommendations on travel
Information for travellers
Measures at borders for international travellers
 coming from or going to affected areas
Entry screening anticipated
Exit screening anticipated
Quarantine of passengers coming
from suspected areas anticipated
Measures for travellers on board
 international conveyances from affected areas
International cooperation
with neighbouring countries explicit
Restrictions anticipated on importing
goods from affected countries considered
0 5 10 15 20 25
No. of countries
Fig. 1. Border control measures mentioned in European national preparedness 
plans, by number of countries
guidance favours exit screening over en-
try screening, only 10 countries planned 
to implement exit screening.
Only nine countries had plans 
that addressed how travellers on board 
international conveyances from af-
fected areas would be managed. Eight 
recommended separating sick travellers 
from others, and four aimed to provide 
masks to passengers, crew members or 
both. Border quarantine was advocated 
by 11 countries, mostly for travellers en 
route from an affected area, but most 
acknowledged that this strategy would 
be limited in scope. Thirteen countries 
addressed the issue of imported goods 
during a pandemic, with most referring 
to restrictions on poultry imports.
Only about half of the countries 
explicitly planned to coordinate their 
strategies with those of neighbouring 
countries.
Vaccines
All but one country had plans for pan-
demic vaccination; Fig. 2 highlights the 
key issues of these plans. Broadly, plans 
included details on sourcing vaccines, on 
which populations should be vaccinated 
first and on provisions to distribute and 
administer vaccine. Eighteen countries 
stated explicitly that they planned to 
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vaccinate their whole population. Only 
three countries did not stipulate groups 
to be given priority when vaccine is in 
short supply.
The definition of priority groups 
was broadly consistent, with health-care 
workers named as a priority group in 
26 countries. “Essential” workers were 
given priority in 23 countries, and 19 
countries prioritized older people and 
populations at risk of serious complica-
tions. In practice the groups given high-
est priority were health-care workers in 
16 countries, essential workers in four 
countries and people at risk of serious 
complications in three countries. Eight 
countries that defined priority groups 
for vaccination did not rank them 
explicitly. Sixteen countries estimated 
the size of priority groups. Some plans 
specifically prioritized vaccination of 
children, employees and people thought 
likely to pose a risk to vulnerable groups. 
Most plans explicitly prioritized groups 
in order to maintain health-care services 
and societal functions and to protect 
those at highest risk of death, yet the 
ethical reasoning for priority-setting was 
rarely explicit (Box 1).
Vaccination strategies revealed im-
portant gaps. A minority of plans referred 
to or included operational guidelines for 
factors such as provisions for vaccine stor-
age, distribution mechanisms and vaccine 
administration. Only three countries 
referred to existing generic plans for mass 
vaccination. Nine countries described 
how vaccine will be delivered to priority 
groups, including four that stated the 
need for local administrations to deter-
mine in advance which individuals should 
be vaccinated first. Few details were 
provided on who would be responsible 
for vaccination and where it would be 
done.
The plans of Belgium, France, Ger-
many, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Romania and the United Kingdom 
stated that these countries are capable 
of manufacturing vaccine. Four coun-
tries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden and 
Switzerland) intended to develop vac-
cine production capacity. Twenty-one 
countries planned to secure vaccine pre-
purchase agreements, and four countries 
said such agreements were already in 
place. Five explicitly indicated that they 
have arranged to buy H5N1 vaccine; 
two countries, Finland and Switzerland, 
had placed orders for vaccine to cover 
their entire population.
Fig. 2. Vaccine strategy measures mentioned in European national preparedness 
plans, by number of countries
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Antiviral drugs
Although most countries had antiviral 
strategies, these varied considerably 
(Fig. 3). All countries but one advocated 
the use of antiviral drugs for treatment. 
Although treatment was generally clearly 
defined, use of antivirals for prophylaxis 
was less so. For some plans, distinctions 
between pre-exposure and post-exposure 
prophylaxis often were not clear. Just 
over half of the countries planned to 
supply antivirals for early containment, 
and 20 recommended specific treatment 
and prophylaxis strategies for animal 
workers. Five countries anticipated a 
need to supply antiviral drugs to their 
citizens abroad.
Plans for dosage and duration for 
treatment and prophylaxis were gener-
ally consistent with manufacturers’ rec-
ommendations. Twenty-two countries 
specified which antivirals they intended 
to use, with half advising the possible 
use of M2-membrane protein inhibi-
tors (amantadine and rimantadine) in 
addition to neuraminidase inhibitors 
(oseltamivir and zanamivir) for prophy-
laxis or as a second-line drug.
Treatment was explicitly given pri-
ority over prophylaxis by 15 countries, 
which mostly outlined plans for antiviral 
use according to WHO pandemic phase. 
They noted that in phase 6, prophylaxis 
probably will not be feasible and might 
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Box 1. Ethics and priority-setting
An influenza pandemic will raise many ethical challenges, including allocation of scarce resources and the needs to balance individual 
freedom against the common good, economic losses against the need to contain the disease, and health workers’ duty to provide care against 
self-interest.a,b Although national preparedness plans provide an important opportunity for transparent communication with the public, most of 
those examined for this analysis failed to discuss these issues. Plans usually stated that their goal was to decrease morbidity and mortality and 
ensure that society still functions. However, the lack of ethical reasoning, especially regarding resource allocation, might cause confusion when 
policies and practices need to be justified to an anxious population.
Finland and Norway discussed ethical concerns and expressed differing views. The Finnish plan suggested that beyond early containment of 
the disease, “long-term preventative medication with antivirals of essential personnel would not be justifiable and would create a feeling of 
unfairness within the population”. The Norwegian plan stated that “health care personnel who are continually exposed to the disease [should] 
receive the highest priority because they are crucial in providing care for a greater number of patients and because they have a higher risk of 
being infected.”
a  University of Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics. Ethical considerations in preparedness planning for pandemic influenza. Toronto: University of Toronto; 2005. 
b  Singer PA, Benatar SR, Bernstein M, Daar AS, Dickens BM, MacRae SK, et al. Ethics and SARS: lessons from Toronto. BMJ 2003;327:1342-4. 
result in drug resistance. The other 
countries did not distinguish between 
use of antivirals for treatment and pro-
phylaxis.
Priority groups for antiviral treat-
ment were stated by 19 countries, 16 of 
which indicated the size of these groups. 
Seventeen countries planned to treat 
patients at the greatest risk of complica-
tions. Patients with severe disease and 
complications were top-priority in eight 
countries, while health-care workers 
were top-priority in two countries. 
France and Switzerland suggested that 
they had sufficient stockpiles to treat 
all patients.
Twenty-two plans advised offer-
ing pre-exposure prophylaxis; of these, 
21 suggested health-care workers as 
recipients, and 17 suggested essential 
workers. Only 12 countries explicitly 
ranked priority groups for prophylaxis. 
Some plans discouraged seasonal use 
of antivirals because this would rapidly 
deplete stockpiles. Norway prioritized 
prophylaxis for continuously exposed 
health-care workers over treatment of 
sick patients in order to maintain a 
functioning health service.
Twenty-five plans recommended 
post-exposure prophylaxis. Thirteen 
stated that this strategy should be used 
only in the early phases for contacts of 
cases and exposed animal workers. Only 
one country estimated the number 
of contacts who might need antiviral 
drugs.
The operational management of 
antiviral storage, distribution and ad-
ministration remained underdeveloped 
in most plans. Sixteen countries planned 
to devolve all or parts of these respon-
sibilities to local administrations. Only 
13 mentioned distribution centres such 
as influenza pandemic centres, hospital 
pharmacies and community pharmacies, 
but these were not discussed in detail. 
Few plans mentioned the need for 
prescriptions. Eight plans addressed the 
need for security measures at antiviral 
drug distribution centres.
Most plans stated an intention to 
stockpile antiviral drugs, with 14 plans 
noting that a stockpile had been secured. 
Eleven plans quantified their existing 
stockpile and nine defined a target stock-
pile, usually assuming an attack rate of 
25–30% of the population.
Discussion
Europe became better prepared for 
pandemic human influenza than it was 
before the study period.5,6,10,11 Between 
November 2005 and November 2006, 
more countries published national 
strategic plans, and many countries 
and international agencies (such as the 
ECDC) have made considerable efforts 
to support planning through regional 
workshops, country visits and analyses 
of preparedness status.12 An increased 
number of plans consider an early con-
tainment strategy that offers prophy-
laxis to contacts and discuss the need to 
protect people who work with animals. 
Clarity and links to operational imple-
mentation also have improved. More 
countries prioritize the use of antivirals 
for treatment and prophylaxis, enhanc-
ing strategic clarity.
A recent World Bank report empha-
sizes the need for clear procedures and 
systems to manage rapid reporting and 
responses to human influenza, notably 
to ensure a rapid containment response. 
Our findings show that even in Europe, 
which may be better prepared than 
some regions,3 considerable gaps and 
inconsistencies persist and several areas 
of operational planning have not been 
addressed. For example, only half the 
countries have developed storage, distri-
bution and administration strategies for 
vaccines and antivirals. The issue of how 
to deliver antivirals within 48 hours to 
individual patients remains largely un-
resolved. The recent increase in national 
antiviral stockpiles by many countries 
perhaps highlights this gap. Many 
countries are devolving responsibility 
to local administrations but providing 
little guidance. Consequently, they risk 
inconsistencies in practice, inequalities 
in provision of goods, chaotic service 
responses and public anxiety during a 
pandemic.
Likewise, although most countries 
have prioritized groups for vaccination 
and antivirals, details of how these poli-
cies would be put into action are still 
scarce. Plans do not always specify types 
of antiviral drugs to be used, and drug 
resistance is a concern with monother-
apy.13 If international policies change 
in response to this risk, delivery systems 
need to be even more robust. The size of 
priority groups is often unclear because 
their scope is not clearly defined. Ad-
ditionally, groups are often much larger 
than the actual (or intended) stockpile 
could accommodate. Some countries 
attempt to resolve this issue by building 
stockpiles large enough that priority-
setting is not an issue, but use of antiviral 
prophylaxis is likely to deplete stocks 
quickly. For example, our analysis of 
whether four countries have sufficient 
publicly acknowledged antiviral stock-
piles to meet the needs stated in their 
plans suggest that shortfalls will occur 
(Fig. 4), despite assumptions that prob-
ably underestimate demand.
Governments need to balance pol-
icy in the face of uncertainty. Although 
considerable funds have been com-
mitted to stockpiling antivirals, many 
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Fig. 3. Antiviral drug strategy measures mentioned in European national 
preparedness plans, by number of countries
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countries may have insufficient sup-
plies. Moreover, if resistance emerges 
rapidly, then the expected public health 
benefits might not accrue. The ability of 
combination therapy to prevent resis-
tance remains debatable,14 although the 
ineffectiveness of adamantanes in pre-
venting transmission, the rapid devel-
opment of resistance to these drugs and 
probable associated harms imply that 
neuraminidase inhibitors will require 
supplementation with other drugs.15 
However, combination treatment would 
further stretch resources and compound 
logistical challenges.
If vaccine development cannot take 
advantage of the window of opportu-
nity offered by antiviral drugs, further 
concerns arise. An effective vaccine is 
unlikely to be available for 3–6 months 
after a pandemic begins. Even if it can 
be made quickly enough,16 demand 
will outstrip supply. Six billion people 
worldwide could benefit from protec-
tion, but manufacturing capacity is cur-
rently about 300 million doses. Recent 
findings showing cross-protection with 
influenza virus from avian to human 
strains17,18 have led some countries to 
stockpile H5N1 vaccine in the hope 
that it could offer protection against an 
emergent pandemic strain.
Across Europe, plans for border 
control measures are inconsistent, espe-
cially in relation to screening practices 
and travel restrictions; such plans fre-
quently diverge from WHO guidelines. 
These inconsistencies might reflect a 
lack of evidence. Recent research suggest-
ing that very strict travel measures might 
delay a country’s exposure to a pandemic 
may also have affected plans.19,20 In view 
of the political volatility attached to 
differences in national approaches, in-
creased coherence is advisable.
In preparing for the next pandemic, 
governments face challenges that are 
beyond their purview and over which 
they have little control. Important les-
sons have been learned from SARS, and 
the international governance structure of 
public health has improved, particularly 
in surveillance capacity, coordination 
and cooperation. However, response 
capacity and coherence remain relatively 
weak. These problems arise because 
risk management, even more than risk 
assessment, remains under sovereign 
states’ control 21 despite the authority 
provided through the new International 
Health Regulations.22 For example, 
Indonesia recently stopped sharing 
human genetic samples of H5N1 with 
foreign laboratories because its govern-
ment wanted to retain control of the 
intellectual property rights of the virus 
strain23 and secure early public health 
protection for its citizens. The potential 
delays in vaccine production that could 
result from such unilateral action could 
have far-reaching implications testing 
assumptions about global solidarity.24
Our evaluation’s  l imitations 
are similar to those of our previous 
study.5,6,25 Although our survey pro-
vides only a snapshot, it is based on 
a similar analysis from a year earlier 
so that changes and advances can be 
documented. Our results, as with earlier 
findings, agree largely with analyses 
done by other investigators using differ-
ent methods.12,15,26 A second limitation 
is that plans are only one element in 
a preparedness strategy, albeit an im-
portant one. By revisiting plans after a 
year, we have at least shown that policy-
makers have addressed some previously 
neglected issues. A further limitation is 
the subjective nature of our assessment. 
We have tried, through independent 
review, to address this issue. However, 
variations in format, terminology and 
API, active pharmaceutical ingredient.
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Fig. 4. Potential demand and stockpiles for antiviral drugs for four European 
Union countries
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Assumptions: stockpiles have been made public,a attack rate of 25%, treatment needed for 50% infected. Estimates for 
pre-exposure prophylaxis requirements are for health care workers only, and do not include other groups mentioned in the 
plans.b Norway has committed to procuring an additional 12 million doses of rimantadin/amantadin for prophyaxis alone; 
this is not included here. 
a  Stockpile size sources: Bulgaria, BBC Monitoring International Reports, 12 January 2006; Cyprus, Cyprus Mail, 25 January 
2006; Norway, Norway National Pandemic Preparedness Plan, 2006; United Kingdom, Reuters, March 2006.
b  Population data taken from Eurostat website (available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_
pageid=1996,39140985&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&screen=detailref&language=en&product=Yearlies_new_
population&root=Yearlies_new_population/C/C1/C11/caa10000). Health-care worker figures taken from WHO, World 
health statistics 2006 (Geneva: WHO; 2006).
language mean that any evaluation of 
plans must be subjective.
Governmental commitment across 
Europe in preparing for a pandemic 
seems strong, and Europe has strength-
ened its plans since our last evaluation. 
However, the remaining gaps and 
inconsistencies need urgent attention. 
Although pandemic influenza will test 
health systems in many unforeseen 
ways, coherent regional planning should 
ensure that responses are coordinated, 
evidence-based and coherent in order to 
effectively protect public health.  ■
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Résumé
Améliorations et insuffisances des plans stratégiques nationaux européens pour faire face à la grippe 
pandémique
Objectif Renouveler et mettre à jour notre précédente évaluation 
(2005) des plans nationaux européens de préparation à la grippe 
pandémique et évaluer les progrès réalisés.
Méthodes Nous avons évalué les plans nationaux de 
préparation à la grippe pandémique publiés par les pays de 
l’Union européenne, par deux pays en voie d’accession à l’UE 
(Bulgarie et Roumanie) et par la Norvège, la Suisse et la Turquie. Pour 
être inclus dans l’étude, les plans devaient avoir été formellement 
publiés avant le 30 septembre 2006. Nous nous sommes référés 
aux recommandations de l’OMS et nous avons utilisé un formulaire 
d’extraction des données systématiquement appliqué. Nous avons 
examiné le contenu des plans en ce qui concerne les contrôles aux 
frontières, les antiviraux et les vaccins.
Résultats Les plans de vingt-neuf pays ont été inclus dans 
l’analyse contre vint-et-un en 2005. Ces plans présentaient des 
différences substantielles à propos des mesures de contrôle 
aux frontières et beaucoup d’entre eux s’écartaient des 
recommandations de l’OMS. De même, le volet médicaments 
antiviraux et vaccins des plans était traité de manière variable et le 
volet planification opérationnelle restait peu développé.
Conclusion Malgré les progrès réalisés en matière de 
complétude, il reste à résoudre des problèmes de divergence des 
plans avec les recommandations internationales, d’incohérence 
persistante sur le plan stratégique et de limitation de la 
planification opérationnelle, en relation éventuellement avec 
un manque de moyens. En ce qui concerne les contrôles aux 
frontières, les plans présentent aussi des lacunes et des 
incohérences et sont susceptibles d’être modifiés en fonction de 
considérations politiques pendant une pandémie.
Objetivo Repetir y actualizar nuestra evaluación anterior (2005) 
de los planes nacionales de preparación para una gripe pandémica 
elaborados en Europa y determinar los avances conseguidos.
Métodos Se evaluaron los planes nacionales de preparación 
para una gripe pandémica publicados en los países de la Unión 
Europea, en los dos países en fase de adhesión (Bulgaria y 
Rumania) y en Noruega, Suiza y Turquía. El requisito para incluir 
los planes era que hubiesen sido publicados oficialmente antes 
del 30 de septiembre de 2006. Empleamos como referencia 
Resumen
Progresos y deficiencias de los planes estratégicos nacionales europeos para afrontar una gripe pandémica
directrices de la OMS y utilizamos un formulario de obtención 
de datos que se aplicó sistemáticamente. Los planes fueron 
analizados en relación con las medidas de control fronterizo, los 
medicamentos antivirales y las vacunas.
Resultados Veintinueve países disponían de planes que fueron 
incluidos en el análisis, en comparación con 21 países en 2005. 
Se observaron diferencias sustanciales entre los planes de los 
países en lo relativo a las medidas de control fronterizo, y muchos 
de los planes se apartaban de las directrices de la OMS. Diferían 
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también entre los países los planes referentes a los antivirales y las 
vacunas, y la planificación operacional seguía siendo deficiente.
Conclusión Aunque los planes son ahora más completos, 
siguen sin resolver los problemas que entrañan la divergencia 
de los planes nacionales respecto a las recomendaciones 
internacionales, la persistente incoherencia estratégica y 
las limitaciones operacionales asociadas a unos recursos 
potencialmente escasos. Los planes de control fronterizo muestran 
también lagunas e incongruencias, y probablemente serán 
políticamente volátiles en caso de pandemia.
صخلم
ةيحئاجلا ازنولفنلأل ةيبورولأا ةينطولا ةيجيتارـتسلاا ططخلا في روصقلا هجوأو زرْحُمـلا م ُّدقتلا
 ططخلل 2005 ماع نوثحابلا هارجأ يذلا ميـيقتلا ثيدحتو ةداعإ :فدهلا
.زرْحُمـلا م ُّدقتلا ميـيقتلو ةيحئاجلا ازنولفنلأل ب ُّهأتلل ةيبورولأا ةينطولا
 ازنولفنلأل ب ُّهأتلاب ةصاخلا ةروشنلما ةينطولا ططخلا نوثحابلا مَّيق :ةقيرطلا
 داحتلال  ًاثيدح ين َّمضنلما  نْيَدلبلا  نم  ،بيورولأا  داحتلاا  نادلب  نم  ةيحئاجلا
 ةلباق ططخلا تناك دقو .ايكرـتو اسريوسو جيونرلا نمو ،)اينامورو ايراغلب(
 .2006 برمتبس/لوليأ 30 لبق ًايمسر تشرن دق تناك اذإ ةساردلا في جامدلإل
 اومدختساو ةيلماعلا ةحصلا ةمظنلم ةيداشرلإا لئلادلا لىإ نوثحابلا عجر دقو
 ةقلعتلما ططخلا نابسحلا في اوذخأ دقو .تايطعلما صلاختسلا ةيجهنم ةقيرط
.تاحاقللاو تاسويرفلل ةداضلما ةيودلأاو دودحلا لىع ةحفاكلما تاءارجإب
 عم ةنراقلماب ،ليلحتلا في تجمدأ ططخ ًادلب 29 ىدل ناك دقل :تادوجولما
 نادلبلا ططخ ينب ةيرهوج تافلاتخا كانه تناك دقو .2005 ماع في ًادلب 21
 لئلادلا نع اديعب ططخلا نم يرثكلا ناكو ،دودحلا لىع ةحفاكلما تاءارجلإ
 ةقلعتلما  نادلبلا  ططخ  نإف  ،لثلمابو  .ةيلماعلا  ةحصلا  ةمظنلم  ةيداشرلإا
 طيطختلا  ناكو  ةتوافتم  تناك  تاحاقللابو  تاسويرفلل  ةداضلما  ةيودلأاب
.ًافيعض لازيلا نياديلما
 كانه لازتلاف ،ططخلا لماكتسا في زرُحأ دق ًام ُّدقت كانه نأ مغر :جاتنتسلاا
 تايصوتلا  نع  ةينطولا  ططخلا  داعتباب  قلعتي  مايف  لحلل  جاتحت  تلاكشم
 قلعتي ام في ةيليغشتلا دويقلاو تايجيتارـتسلاا في رفانتلا رارمتساو ،ةيلودلا
 نم نياعت دودحلا لىع ةحفاكلما ططخ نأ حضتا ماك .ةلمتحلما دراولما ةردنب
.ةحئاجلا ءانثأ سيايس رـتوت ثودحب ددهت دق اهنأو ،تاضقانتلاو تارغثلا
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Table 1. European national preparedness plans for pandemic human influenza
Country Date  
of plan
Length 
(pages)
Original 
language
Source Websites Documents
Strategic 
plan
Operational 
plan
Plan with 
elements  
of both
Austria September 
2005
76 German ECDC website
(direct link)
http://www.bmgf.gv.at/cms/site/attachments/3/6/8/CH0019/CMS1126084167391/
pandemieplanh3neu.pdf
– – Yes
Belgium July 2006 52 French ECDC website
(via MoH website)
http://www.influenza.be – – Yes
Bulgaria October  
2006
100 English UNDG website
(direct link)
http://www.undg.org/documents/7926-Bulgaria_National_Influenza_Plan.pdf – – Yes
Cyprus September 
2005
96 + 11 
(tabulated 
appendices)
Greek ECDC website
(via MoH website)
http://www.moh.gov.cy/moh/moh.nsf/All/
4CCD90ECED95DD174225718800218F00?OpenDocument
– – Yes
Czech
Republic
April 2004 53 English WHO web
(direct link)
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/nationalpandemic/en/index.html – – Yes
Denmark April 2006 57 + 97 
(appendix)
Danish ECDC website
(via MoH website)
http://www.sst.dk/Forebyggelse/Sygdomsforebyggelse_og_vaccination/Smitsomme_
sygd/Influenza/Pandemiberedskab.aspx?lang=da
– Yes  
(appendix)
Yes
Estonia March  
2006
55 Estonian ECDC website
(direct link)
http://www.sm.ee/est/HtmlPages/
Sotsiaalministeeriumigripipandeemiaksvalmisolekuplaanaprill2006a/$file/Sotsiaalminist
eeriumi%20gripipandeemiaks%20valmisoleku%20plaan%20aprill%202006%20a.doc
– – Yes
Finland 2006 202 Finnish WHO Regional Office  
for Europe Website  
(direct link)
http://www.euro.who.int/flu/related/20060822_1 (WHO web page)
http://www.stm.fi/Resource.phx/publishing/documents/6425/index.htx (plan location)
– – Yes
France January  
2006
68 French ECDC website
(direct link)
http://www.grippeaviaire.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Plan_pandemie_grippale_janvier_2006.pdf
http://www.sante.gouv.fr/dossiers/grippe_aviaire/fiches_techniques.htm (Appendices, 
accessed 31/08/06)
– Yes  
(appendices)
Yes
Germany March  
2005
90
(in 3 parts)
German ECDC
(via MoH website)
http://www.rki.de/cln_011/nn_879788/DE/Content/InfAZ/I/Influenza/
Influenzapandemieplan.html
– – Yes
Greece October 2005 44 English ECDC website
(via MoH website)
http://www.keel.org.gr/keelpno/National_plan.pdf – – Yes
Hungary October  
2005
22 English MoH website http://www.eum.hu/index.php?akt_menu=2652&hir_reszlet=8 – – Yes
Ireland 2002 119 English Fluwiki
(via MoH website)
http://www.fluwikie.com/pmwiki.php?n=Geographic.Ireland (Fluwiki web page)
http://www.dohc.ie/publications/influenza_pandemic.html (MoH web page)
– – Yes
Italy 2006 32 English ECDC
(direct link)
http://www.ccm.ministerosalute.it/imgs/C_17_pubblicazioni_511_allegato.pdf – – Yes
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Country Date  
of plan
Length 
(pages)
Original 
language
Source Websites Documents
Strategic 
plan
Operational 
plan
Plan with 
elements  
of both
Latvia October  
2005
16 Latvian ECDC
(direct link)
http://phoebe.vm.gov.lv/faili/gripa/info_20051018.pdf – – Yes
Lithuania September 
2005
7 English ECDC
(direct link)
http://www.vvspt.lt/aktai/gripas/2005%2009%2020%20GRIPO%20PLANO%20VERT.
doc
– – Yes
Luxembourg July  
2006
24
(in 2 parts)
French ECDC
(via MoH website)
http://www.grippeaviaire.public.lu/ – Yes –
Netherlands October  
2005
59 + 246
(appendices)
Dutch WHO Regional Office  
for Europe Website
(via MoH website)
http://www.euro.who.int/flu/related/20060822_1 (WHO web page)
http://www.infectieziekten.info/index.php3?lokatie=http%3A//www.infectieziekten.
info/protocol.php3%3Fpagid%3D142 (MoH web page)
Yes Yes Yes
Norway February 
2006
145 + 
appendices
Norwegian Fluwiki
(direct link)
http://www.fluwikie.com/pmwiki.php?n=Geographic.Norway Yes Yes –
Poland August  
2005
80 English UNDG website
(direct link)
http://www.undg.org/content.cfm?id=1575 – – Yes
Portugal January  
2006
23 Portuguese ECDC
(direct link)
http://www.dgs.pt/upload/membro.id/ficheiros/i007770.pdf – – Yes
Romania October  
2005
23 Romanian MoH contacted  
in person
Not applicable (paper copy obtained) – – Yes
Slovakia November 
2005
103 English ECDC
(via MoH website)
http://www.health.gov.sk/redsys/rsi.nsf/0/D2869A65B5F83280C12570EC00517352?
OpenDocument
– – Yes
Slovenia July 2006 66 Slovenian Ministry of Health, 
Slovenia
Yes
Spain May 2005 43 English ECDC (direct link) http://www.msc.es/ciudadanos/enfLesiones/enfTransmisibles/docs/PlanGripeIngles.pdf Yes – –
Sweden November 
2005
23 + 32 Swedish ECDC
(via MoH website)
http://www.socialstyrelsen.se/Publicerat/2005/8972/2005-130-7.htm
http://www.socialstyrelsen.se/Publicerat/2005/8660/2005-131-7.htm
http://www.socialstyrelsen.se/Publicerat/2005/8662/2005-130-2.htm
– – Yes
Switzerland May 2006 249
(in 3 parts)
French MoHweb http://www.bag.admin.ch/influenza/01120/01134/index.html?lang=fr Yes (parts  
1 and 2)
Yes  
(part 3)
–
Turkey June 2006 184 English ECDC
(direct link)
http://www.grip.saglik.gov.tr/eng/index.html – – Yes
United 
Kingdom
October  
2005
177 English ECDC
(direct link)
http://www.dh.gov.uk/assetRoot/04/12/17/44/04121744.pdf (Department of Health 
plan); http://www.hpa.org.uk/infections/topics_az/influenza/pandemic/documents/
HPAPanFluContPlanSept06.pdf (UK Health Protection Agency Plan)
– – Yes
MoH, Ministry of Health; ECDC, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control; UNDG, United Nations Development Group.
(Table 1, cont.)
